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Article 6

THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND THE COURSE OF
RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY
DAAN BRAVEMAN*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Selection of appropriate limits on governmental support of religion has been a difficult task for the Supreme Court. Although Jefferson's metaphorical "wall"' between church and state may be a
"useful figurative illustration to emphasize the concept of separateness, '"2

some

limited entanglement

between

government

and

religion has proved inevitable.' The difficulty in drawing an appropriate line is well illustrated by two observations of Justice Jackson.
He observed that "nearly everything in our culture worth transmitting, everything which gives meaning to life, is saturated with religious influences. .

. ."'

Yet, in dissenting from the Court's decision

to uphold release time for religious education,' Justice Jackson
wrote of the need to avoid governmental intrusion into religious
matters:
It is possible to hold a faith with enough confidence to believe that what should be rendered to God does not need
to be decided and collected by Caesar. The day that this
country ceases to be free for irreligion it will cease to be
free for religion-except for the sect that can win political
power.6
The Court's struggle to find an appropriate dividing line between proper and improper governmental support of religion has
produced decisions that may appear to be based on rather fine distinctions. 7 Nevertheless, until recently, one principle seemed to
* Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law. The author would like to
express his special thanks to Deborah Blood for her research assistance.
1. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
2. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 123 (1982).
3. Id.
4. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 236 (1948) (JacksonJ.,
concurring).
5. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
6. Id. at 324-25 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
7. Compare Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) wilh Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349 (1975). In Wolman the Court approved provision of books, standardized testing,
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emerge rather clearly-the need for "scrupulous neutrality" 8 by
government. As the Court held in Epperson v. Arkansas,9 the first
amendment requires governmental neutrality between religion and
nonreligion, as well as between various religions:
Government in our democracy ...must be neutral in mat-

ters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may not
be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of non-religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or
religious theory against another or even against the militant opposite.'O
Although occasionally difficult to apply, the neutrality principle
appeared well settled until the Court's recent decision in Lynch v.
Donnelly. " Plaintiffs in that case challenged the inclusion of a creche
in a government sponsored Christmas display in Pawtucket, Rhode
Island. An amicus brief submitted jointly by the National Council of
the Churches of Christ and the American Jewish Committee observed that it is "hard to think of a doctrine that is more quintessentially religious in nature than that embodied in the Creche."'' 2 As
the brief pointed out, "[t]he creche is a depiction, in adorational
terms, of the birth of a divinity in the form of the infant Jesus....
The doctrine of the birth of Jesus is not only central to Christianity
but also serves, both historically and theologically, to separate
Christianity from other religions."'"
Notwithstanding the sacred religious symbolism of the creche,
the Court held that the establishment clause did not prevent inclusion of the nativity scene in the city's Christmas display. The approach used by the plurality in Lynch is much more devastating to
first amendment doctrine than its result. Indeed, it has been said
that some Supreme Court decisions render "a far more subtle blow
and diagnostic, therapeutic, and remedial services to children in nonpublic schools because they were of primary benefit to the children; and rejected provision of instructional equipment and field trips because they primarily benefitted the school. In Meek,
the Court had used basically the same analysis to reject provision of counseling, therapeutic, and remedial services. What apparently made the difference in lWolman was that
these services were provided off school premises.
8. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 745 (1976).
9. 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
10. Id. at 103-04.
1l.465 U.S. 668 (1984).
12. Brief of the National Jewish Committee and the National Council of the
Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
13. Id.
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to liberty than the conduct [specifically under challenge]."' 4 Lynch
is precisely such a decision.
This Article examines, in light of Lynch, the continuing vitality
of the neutrality principle as a basis for deciding establishment
clause cases. Part II discusses the emergence and relatively consistent application of the principle prior to Lynch. Part III examines
the abandonment of religious neutrality in Lynch and explores the
plurality's redefinition of the purpose of the establishment clausein particular, the Supreme Court's apparent acceptance of the view
that we are not simply a religious people, but more specifically, a
Christian people. Finally, Part IV reviews the past Term's establishment clause cases and attempts to assess their impact on the course
of religious neutrality. In the wake of these recent decisions, some
commentators have concluded that the wall between church and
state is now as strong as ever. However, this Article urges a bit
more caution and concludes that while the wall of separation is still
standing, the foundation has been seriously weakened.
II.

RELIGIOUS

A.

NEUTRALITY

Introduction

In deciding establishment clause cases, the Court has been
forced to reconcile the "inescapable tension"' 5 between two competing propositions. On the one hand, religion has been closely
identified with many of our governmental institutions. 6 Indeed,
numerous official references to religion or a deity can be found
throughout our history. The Declaration of Independence, for example, refers to a "Creator."' 7 President George Washington proclaimed November 26, 1789, a day of thanksgiving to offer prayers
to the "Lord."' 8 Other presidents have repeatedly issued proclamations that acknowledge religious holidays." ' Sessions of Congress
open with a prayer,"° and both the national motto and the pledge of
allegiance refer to "God."'" These and other2 2 illustrations confirm
14. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 245-46 (1944) (Jackson, J..
dissenting).
15. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 672.
16. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 212 (1963).
17. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
18. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 675 n.2.
19. Id.; but see R. MORGAN, TlHE SUI'REME COURT AND RELIGION 28-30 (1972) (of the
first four Presidents, two approved of ceremonial invocations of nondenominational religion, two did not).
20. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
21. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 676.
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the frequently cited observation in Zorach v. Clausen1 3 that "[w]e are
a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being. "24
On the other hand, religious freedom is firmly embedded in our
tradition, 25 and the presence of a barrier between secular and religious matters has allowed that freedom to flourish. As the Court
previously observed, the "exalted ' 26 place of religion has been
"achieved through a long tradition of reliance on the home, the
church and the inviolable citadel of the individual heart and
mind....

[I]t is not within the power of government to invade that

citadel, whether its purpose or effect be to aid or oppose, to advance
27
or retard.

'

In its attempts to reconcile this tension, the Court has not insisted on absolute separation of church and state. Such an absolutist position may well be undesirable and, as a practical matter,
impossible to sustain. 28 Thus, on various occasions the Court upheld governmental action that may have provided some benefit to
religion. In each instance, however, the Court found that government had remained neutral on religious matters and had not promoted one religious theory over another or religion over
nonreligion. 29 Equally important, the Court maintained its own
neutrality by scrupulously avoiding any endorsement of religious
theory, practice, or doctrine.
B.

The Development of the Neutrality Principle

The decision in Everson v. Board of Education3 0 illustrates the
Court's pre-Lynch approach to establishment clause cases. In that
case the Board of Education had authorized reimbursement of
money spent by parents for their children's bus transportation to
public as well as Catholic schools."i The Court found no violation
22. Id.
23. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
24. Id. at 313.
25. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214.
26. Id. at 226; see generally Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution, 1983
Sup. CT. REV. 83 (1984).

27. 374 U.S. at 226.
28. See Lynch, 465 U.S. 672-73; see P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW (1961); Katz,
Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 426 (1953).
29. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397

U.S. 664 (1970); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
30. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
31. The Board excluded payment for transportation of any pupil attending a "private school run for profit." This exclusion was not challenged. Id. at 4 n.2.
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of the first amendment even though such financial reimbursement
plainly helped these children attend church schools, and thus, indiIn reaching this conclusion,
rectly benefited religious institutions.
the Court stressed that the Board had acted in a neutral fashion because transportation, like other public services provided to churches
and "indisputa(police and fire protection, for example), is separate
33
bly marked off from the religious function."

One might certainly challenge the majority's notion that the
state acted neutrally. Justice Jackson argued in a forceful dissent
that reimbursement for transportation to Catholic schools differs
significantly from provision of other public services. He pointed out
that "[n]either the fireman nor the policeman has to ask before he
renders aid 'Is this man or building identified with the Catholic
Church?' 34
While reasonable people might differ over application of the
neutrality principle in Everson, all Members of the Court clearly relied on that principle as a method for resolving the tension generated by the dispute. The majority expressly stated that the first
amendment "requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with
groups of religious believers and non-believers ....

-

Moreover,

the Court maintained its own neutrality on religious matters; it upheld the law because it viewed the legislation as simply providing "a
general program to help parents get their children, regardless of
their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from accredited
schools.

' 36

In Zorach v. Clauson,3 7 the Court rejected a first amendment
challenge to a New York law that allowed public school students to
leave school buildings and attend religious institutions for instruction or devotional exercises. As in Everson, the Court attempted to
avoid crossing the fine line between permissible accommodation
and impermissible endorsement of religion. The majority held that
the New York release time program was constitutional because it
involved neither religious instruction in the public schools nor expenditure of any public funds. 38 The Court relied on the absence of
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

17.
18.
25 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
18.

36. Id.

37.
38.
that in
during

343 U.S. 306.
Id. at 308-09. In this regard, the New York program was distinguishable from
McCollum, in which religious instruction took place on public school property
school hours. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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any evidence that public school officials coerced students to participate in the release time program.3 9 In fact, the Court found that
school authorities were completely neutral in this regard.4 0 Accordingly, to uphold New York's release time program, the Court did
not have to support any particular religious doctrine or religion
over nonreligion. The Court, like the school personnel, assumed an
attitude that "show[ed] no partiality to any one group and that [let]
each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of
its dogma."'"
The Court's impartiality was equally evident in Board of Education v. Allen, 42 in which the Court again upheld governmental conduct that arguably benefited religion. 43 The challenged statute
authorized the loan of textbooks to school children, including those
attending parochial schools. The textbooks were those designated
for use in public schools or approved by a board of education.4 4 In
rejecting a first amendment challenge, the Court underscored the
state's secular purpose to further educational opportunities for all
children.4 5 It emphasized that parochial schools perform a secular
function as well as their obvious sectarian one.4 6 Because the trial
court decided the case on cross-motions for summary judgment,4 7
nothing in the record indicated that any of the textbooks were used
by the parochial schools to promote their religious function, 48 and
the Court refused to assume that all textbooks-whether they dealt
with mathematics, literature, or science-were used to further a religious purpose. Therefore, the Court upheld the textbook loan provision because it perceived that the service provided was so separate
from any religious function that it reflected a neutral position toward religion. Manifestly, the Court again reached its result without
endorsing any religious practice, theory, or doctrine. Indeed, five
years later the Court explained that the result in Allen was premised
39. 343 U.S. at 311. The Court suggested that if the authorities had used their position to force students to take religious instruction, a wholly different case would have
been presented. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 313.
42. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
43. The Court observed that no funds or books were furnished directly to parochial
schools. Nevertheless, free books may have made it more likely that some children
would choose to attend parochial schools. Id. at 243-44.
44. Id. at 239.
45. Id. at 243.
46. Id. at 247-48.
47. Id. at 248.
48. Id.
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on its perception that the textbook loan provision reflected a neutral

attitude toward religion.4 9
The Court also maintained a position of scrupulous neutrality
when it considered the constitutionality of governmental financial
assistance to institutions of higher learning, including sectarian
ones. 5' The decision in Hunt v. McNair5 1 is typical of the Court's
approach. Plaintiffs in Hunt attacked a South Carolina law establishing an authority that could issue revenue bonds to assist colleges in
construction projects. Plaintiffs argued that the law violated the establishment clause because it authorized such assistance to the Baptist College at Charleston. Despite the affiliation of the college, the
Court found no constitutional violation. The Court stressed that
the aid was not limited to sectarian institutions, but rather was available to all institutions regardless of whether they had religious affiliations. 52 Moreover, the statute explicitly excluded financing of any
projects that included facilities to be used for religious instruction,
religious worship, or departments of divinity. 53 Finally, the Court
underscored the absence of any showing that the college placed special emphasis on religious, rather than secular, education. 5 4
Although the Court held that the aid was constitutionally permissible, its opinion plainly did not embrace religion in general or any
specific religious sect. To the contrary, the Court found that the aid
in Hunt, like that in other cases, 5 5 was constitutionally permissible
because it took the form of a "secular, neutral or nonideological" 5' 6
service that was available to all regardless of religious affiliation.
For similar reasons, the Court concluded in Walz v. Tax Commission 5 7 that New York's property tax exemption for religious organizations was constitutional. Certainly, the challenged exemption
conferred an indirect benefit on religion, but the opinion upholding
49. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 782 (1973).
50. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S.
734 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (plurality opinion).

51. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
52. Id. at 741.
53. Id. at 736-37.
54. Id. at 743-44. In Tilton and Roemer the Court also emphasized the absence of any
evidence in the record that religion permeated the institution. Roemer v. Board of Pub.

Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755-59 (1976); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 680-82 (1971)
(plurality opinion). In Tilton, the Court struck down part of the Act that would allow
federally aided facilities to be used for sectarian purposes after twenty years. 403 U.S. at
683-84, 689.
55. See, e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Roemer v. Board
of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
56. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 687 (1971) (plurality opinion).
57. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
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this practice carefully avoided any endorsement of religion. Instead
the Court focused on the breadth of the exemption, which covered
all property devoted to religious, educational, or charitable purposes. 58 Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the Court emphasized that the exemption reinforced the desired separation of
church and state: 59 "Elimination of exemption would tend to expand the involvement of government by giving rise to tax valuation
of church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures, and the direct confrontations and conflicts that follow in the train of those legal
processes. ' 6° The holding in Walz thus tended to confine, rather
than enlarge, the area of constitutionally permissible state involvement with religion. 6 ' As observed in Walz, the course of neutrality
toward religion may not be an absolutely straight line; 6 2 neverthe-

less, the Court maintained a neutral course in that case.
Even in upholding the constitutionality of Sunday Closing
Laws, the Court wrote opinions that carefully avoided endorsement
of religion or religious practices. 6 ' The Court acknowledged, in McGowan v. Maryland,6 4 that these laws have a strongly religious origin.
The majority pointed out that the Maryland statutes under review
explicitly referred to the "Lord's day" and the "Sabbath day. '"65
Although the Court held that the statutes in question were not laws
respecting an establishment of a religion, its conclusion was premised on the finding that those statutes were no longer rooted in
their religious foundations. 66 The Court traced in detail the emergence of secular justifications for Sunday Closing Laws and
observed:
Numerous laws affecting public health, safety factors in
industry, laws affecting hours and conditions of labor of
58. Id. at 666, 672-73.
59. Id. at 676. Additionally, the Court pointed to the historical acceptance of tax
exemptions for religious institutions. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 676-77 (1971)
(plurality opinion).
60. Id. at 674.
61. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971). See also Committee for Pub.
Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 793 (1973).
62. 397 U.S. at 669.
63. See Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
64. 366 U.S. 420, 433 (1961).
65. See id. at 445.
66. Id. at 447-49. The Court reached the same conclusion regarding the laws under
review in the other cases before the court. Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market,
366 U.S. 617, 624-30 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 602 (1961); Two Guys
v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 598 (1961).
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women and children, week-end diversion at parks and
beaches, and cultural activities of various kinds, now point
the way toward the good life for all. Sunday Closing Laws,
like those before us, have become part and parcel of this
great governmental concern wholly apart from their original purposes or connotations. The present purpose and
effect of most of them is to provide a uniform day of rest
for all citizens; the fact that this day is Sunday, a day of
particular significance for the dominant Christian sect,
does not bar the State from achieving its secular goals.6 7
The Court made clear that its determination applied only to
those Sunday Closing Laws that indeed had a secular purpose and
effect. To underscore this limitation, the Court offered a disclaimer
suggesting that such a law might be unconstitutional if it were
shown that its "purpose-evidenced either on the face of the legislation, in conjunction with its legislative history, or in its operative
effect-is to use the State's coercive power to aid religion." 68 Thus,
although McGowan gave a stamp of approval to laws that provide a
uniform day of rest, it did not sanction religion or religious practices.
The secular reasons behind the Sunday Closing Laws may have coincided with the tenets of certain religions; 6 9 however, in upholding
the laws, the Court was not required to adopt those tenets or to
depart from a neutral position toward religion.
These decisions reveal that the Court has upheld laws that have
benefited religion in some way. In each such instance, however, the
Court found that the challenged provision reflected a neutral attitude toward religion. The neutrality principle, of course, may be
more easily stated than applied.7 ° Nevertheless, in the past, the
Court made a good faith effort to apply the principle, insisted on
neutrality by government officials, and avoided conferring its own
imprimatur on religion or on any specific religious practice or
doctrine.
C.

The Court's Retreat From Neutrality

The first sign that the Court might retreat from its position of
scrupulous neutrality appeared in Mueller v. Allen. 7 ' In that case, the
67. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 444-45.
68. Id. at 453.
69. Id. at 442.
70. See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 747 (1976); Freund, PublicAid
to ParochialSchools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680 (1969).
71. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).

1986]

RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY

Court rejected an establishment clause challenge to a state statute
allowing taxpayers a deduction for expenses incurred in providing
tuition, textbooks, and transportation for children attending elementary and secondary schools. The overwhelming majority of taxpayers eligible for such deductions were parents whose children
attended parochial schools.7 2 Despite the indirect benefit to those
schools, the majority upheld the constitutionality of the provisions
by relying on two features of the legislative scheme: First, the deduction was one of many (such as those for medical expenses and
charitable contributions) available under state tax laws.7" Second,
and most important, the deduction was available for educational expenses incurred by all parents, including those whose children attended public schools or nonsectarian private institutions. 4 The
Court concluded that the challenged statute was neutral on its face
and thus bore enough resemblance to the assistance programs upheld in prior cases to survive constitutional scrutiny.7"
The dissenters criticized the majority for ignoring the actual impact of the tax provisions. In practice, the deductions were not
available to all parents, but only to those whose children attended
schools that charged for tuition or instructional material. This
group of taxpayers was comprised almost entirely of parents who
sent their children to religious schools. 7 6 Moreover, the benefit that
flowed to the sectarian schools from the tuition tax deduction was
not limited to the secular functions performed by those schools.7 7
Similarly, the deduction for instructional material applied even to
material that could be used for religious purposes. 78 Because the
statute provided substantial aid to religious schools and assisted the
sectarian, as well as the secular, functions of those institutions, the
dissenters maintained that the law was unconstitutional.
Perhaps the difference between the majority and the dissent
centered not on the neutrality principle's appropriateness, but on its
application. The majority certainly stressed the facially neutral
characteristics of the statute and stated that it was not embracing
religion. 7 9 In this respect the majority also attempted to maintain
its own neutrality. By refusing to consider the actual impact of the
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

401.
396.
397.
396.
413 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

77. Id.
78. Id. at 414 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 397.
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law,8" however, the majority ignored an important aspect of the
neutrality principle."' This refusal signaled a retreat from the neutrality principle-or, at the very least, a willingness to abide by a
weakened version of the principle.
The neutrality principle was further weakened by the Court's
determination in Marsh v. Chambers 2 that the practice of opening
legislative sessions with a prayer did not violate the establishment
clause. As Justice Brennan stated in his dissent, a legislative prayer
clearly violates the principle that government should remain neutral
in matters of religion:
It intrudes on the right to conscience by forcing some legislators either to participate in a "prayer opportunity"
with which they are in basic disagreement, or to make their
disagreement a matter of public comment by declining to
participate. It forces all residents of the State to support a
religious exercise that may be contrary to their own beliefs.
It requires the State to commit itself on fundamental theological issues. It has the potential for degrading religion by
allowing a religious call to worship to be intermeshed with
a secular call to order. And it injects religion into the political sphere by creating the potential that each and every
selection of a chaplain, or consideration of a particular
prayer, or even reconsideration of the practice itself, will
provoke a political battle along religious lines and ultimately alienate some religiously identified group of
citizens."
The majority made no attempt whatsoever to suggest that a legislative prayer could be justified under the neutrality principle. Instead, it relied on the fact that the practice enjoyed an
"unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 years." 8 4
The Continental Congress opened its sessions with a prayer, and
the First Congress-which approved the language of the first
amendment-adopted a similar practice that has since continued
80. Id. at 401.
81. In previous cases the Court was careful to consider the real impact of the challenged aid on sectarian education. When the aid provided no direct benefit to religious
education, it was upheld. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Board of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). The Court disapproved direct aid to sectarian
schools in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229
(1977).
82. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
83. Id. at 808 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
84. Id. at 792.
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without interruption.8 5 The Court recognized that past practices
alone do not justify contemporary violations of constitutional rights.
Under the facts in Marsh, however, the Court held that the historical
evidence revealed not only what the drafters intended the establishment clause to mean, but also how they thought the clause applied
to the very practice under attack. In short, the Court found that the
Framers' "actions reveal[ed] their intent."-8 6 Accordingly, the Court
concluded that the drafters of the first amendment did not view paid
legislative chaplains or legislative prayers as violations of the establishment clause.8 7
The decision in Marsh, standing alone, might not pose a serious
threat to the neutrality principle. The Court's reliance on the
"unique history" 8 8 of the legislative prayer suggests that the Court
may have been creating an exception to the establishment clause,
rather than reshaping first amendment doctrine.8 9 That exception
plainly allowed governmental officials to abandon a neutral position
toward religion, but only in the context of the legislative prayer.
Moreover, in carving out the exception, the Court itself did not embrace a religious practice, but deferred to the intent of the drafters
in reaching its decision. In this manner the Court preserved its own
neutrality on religion. When considered in isolation, Marsh does
not significantly undermine the general principle that governmental
officials-including Members of the Court-should remain neutral
toward religion and religious practice.
Marsh, however, does not stand in isolation, and when viewed
together with the Court's previous decision in Mueller, provides further evidence of a retreat from the neutrality principle. Finally, any
notion that Marsh might be read narrowly and confined to the special case of legislative prayer was laid to rest by the decision in Lynch
v. Donnelly. 90
III.

THE CRECHE CASE:

A.

NEUTRALITY ABANDONED

Facts

In 1980, the city of Pawtucket erected a Christmas display in a
privately owned park. The display contained (1) a talking wishing
well; (2) Santa's House, inhabited by a live Santa who distributed
85. Id. at 787-89.
86. Id. at 790.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 791.
89. Id. at 796 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
90. 465 U.S. 688 (1984).
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candy; (3) a group of caroler/musician figures; (4) a small village
composed of four houses and a church; (5) four large, five-pointed
stars; (6) three wooden Christmas tree cutouts; (7) a live, forty-foot
Christmas tree strung with lights; (8) a spray of reindeer pulling
Santa's sleigh; (9) a garland hung from candy-striped poles; (10)
cutout letters spelling "Season's Greetings"; and (11) twenty-one
cutout figures representing such characters as a clown, a bear, and a
robot. 9 '

In addition, as it had done for the past forty years, the city included a creche in its Christmas display. The nativity scene occupied 140 square feet 92 of the entire Christmas display. It contained
life-sized figures of "kings bearing gifts, shepherds, animals, and angels," as well as "Mary and Joseph kneeling near the manger in
which the baby [Christ] lies with arms spread in apparent benediction." 93 The creche had been purchased by the city seven years earlier for $1,365. 94 Since then, no money had been spent on its
maintenance, although it was estimated that the city's annual cost of
assembling, removing, and storing the creche was $20.00 and that
95
an additional $20.00 was spent on lighting.
One week before Christmas, a lawsuit was filed challenging the
city's ownership and erection of the creche. Plaintiffs did not contest the entire Christmas display; rather they alleged that the city's
sponsorship of the creche violated the first amendment establishment
clause.9 6 As might have been expected, the lawsuit generated deep
public concern and outright resentment. 9 7 The most recurrent
comments were that "the birth of Christ is the essence of Christmas,
and that the presence of the creche, as a symbol of the spiritual core,
is necessary to preserve the true meaning of the holiday."9 8 The
authors of these comments viewed the lawsuit as an attack on the
very presence of religion as part of the community's life. 99

91. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1155 (D.R.I. 1981).
92. Id. at 1156 n.9.
93. Id. at 1156.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1154, 1156. See notes 30-70 and accompanying text for discussion of the
view espoused by the plaintiffs.
97. 525 F. Supp. at 1161-62.
98. Id. at 1161.
99. Id. at 1162.
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The District Court's Decision

The city first argued that Christmas is a national, secular holiday.' 0 0 The emergence of a secular dimension to Christmas rendered the religious meaning "merely vestigial", and thus, the city's
support of Christmas was secular.' 0 ' The district court agreed that
Christmas has a secular element: "This is the Christmas whose central figure is Santa Claus and whose themes are the nontheological
ones of goodwill, generosity, peace, and less exaltedly,
commercialism."1

0 2

The district court found, nevertheless, that Christmas retains an
important religious dimension. "Janus-like, it is one holiday with
two distinct and very different faces."' 0 3 The central figure of the
religious Christmas is Christ, and the themes are the theological ones
of "salvation and spiritual peace, renewal, and fulfillment."' 4 Governmental participation in the celebration of the secular aspects of
Christmas does not justify governmental support of its religious
components, such as the creche.10 5 "It is too late in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence," the district court wrote, "to suggest that the
Government may endorse the Christian view 10of
Christmas as a cele6
bration of the birthday of the Son of God."'
In its second argument, the city contended that, assuming
Christmas has retained a religious element, the creche itself has become secularized. 0 7 Like Santa Claus, Christmas trees, bells, stars,
and reindeer, the creche, it was suggested, had lost any religious
significance.' 0 8 The district court rejected that suggestion and, in
so doing, expressed its inability to understand what meaning the
creche could have besides the religious one.' 0 9
For its third and final defense, the city of Pawtucket relied on
the three-prong test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman." 0 Assuming the
religious character of the creche, the city contended that its support
100. Id. at 1163.
101. Id.

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. ld. at 1164-65.
106. Id. at 1164.
107. Id. at 1165.
108. Id. at 1166.
109. Id. at 1167.
110. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). A careful reading of Lemio indicates that all three
prongs must be satisfied for the government action to survive the consitutional analysis.
See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1981) ("If a statute violates any of these three
principles, it must be struck down").
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of the creche was constitutional because the support had a secular
purpose, had a secular effect, and involved no excessive governmental entanglement with religion.
To satisfy the first prong of the test, the city argued that its purpose in displaying the creche was not to promote religion, but simply
to acknowledge the religious significance of Christmas."' The
court conceded that it is difficult to draw a precise line between permissible acknowledgement and impermissible promotion of religion."12 It concluded, however, that no such line needed to be
drawn in this case because the record failed to support the city's
position. To the contrary, the district court found that the city used
the creche for the very purposes of promoting the theological
3
message and keeping Christ in Christmas."
The city argued, under the second prong of the Lemon test, that
the effect of displaying the creche was purely secular. The city offered three reasons why the presence of the creche in the Christmas
display did not create the appearance of governmental endorsement
of religion: first, the public was unaware of the city's connection
with the display; second, the creche was only an insignificant part of
the display; and third, the city had made no effort to highlight the
religious message." 4 The court rejected all three contentions. The
court stated that the first contention "border[ed] on the frivolous""' 5 because the public was well aware of the city's connection
with the display. According to the court, the viewing public would
not regard the creche as an insignificant part of the overall display,
given the size and location of the nativity scene. In addition, the
district court found that the religious significance of the creche was
not diminished simply because it was part of a larger, secular Christmas display. The district court also rejected the third contention by
observing that the city appeared to support both aspects of the holiday by commingling secular and religious symbols." 6 This dual
message would be portrayed to the viewing public, many of whom
supported the nativity scene precisely because it perpetuated the
religious element of Christmas.' 17
111. 525 F. Supp. at 1170. The city also argued an economic purpose, but downtown
businessmen testified that the creche added nothing to the Christmas display as a commercial draw. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1172-73.
114. Id. at 1175-76.
115. Id. at 1176.
116. Id. at 1177.
117. Id. at 1161.
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The city also argued that it had satisfied the third prong of the
Lemon test: It had avoided excessive entanglement with religion by
displaying the creche without the participation of religious organizations. The district court agreed, stating that the absence of participation by religious organizations indicated that the city had not
become improperly entangled with religion when it displayed the
creche.' 18 The court concluded, however, that the political divisiveness resulting from the display impermissibly entangled the city
with religion. The court observed that "the atmosphere has been a
horrifying one of anger, hostility, name calling, and political maneuvering, all prompted by the fact that someone had questioned the
City's ownership and display of a religious symbol." ' 9
Accordingly, the district court held that Pawtucket's inclusion
of a nativity scene in its Christmas display violated the establishment
clause. In so doing, the court stressed that the case
is not about an infringement of the right of Christians
freely to express their belief that Christmas is the day on
which the Son of God was born. This decision has nothing
to do with the ability of private citizens to display the
creche in their homes, yards, businesses, or churches.
However, the right to express one's own religious beliefs
does not include the right to have one's government express those beliefs simply because the believers constitute a
20
majority. t

C.

The Supreme Court Opinion

Chief Judge Pettine's careful examination of the issues in the
district court opinion stands in marked contrast to the plurality
opinion of the Supreme Court. 12' Relying more heavily on rhetorical statements 122 than on analysis, the plurality concluded that public sponsorship of a nativity scene does not violate the establishment
118. Id. at 1179.
119. Id.at 1180.
120. Id. The judgment was upheld by a divided panel of the court of appeals. 691

F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982).
121. Lynch, 465 U.S. 668. Chief Justice Burger wrote the opinion and was joined by
Justices White, Powell, and Rehnquist. Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion. Id.
at 687. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Marshall, Blackmun
and Stevens joined. Id. at 694. Justice Blackmun also filed a dissenting opinion in which
Justice Stevens joined. Id. at 726.
122. Id. at 678-85. In the first part of the opinion, the ChiefJustice merely catalogued
examples of public acknowledgement of religion and stressed the importance of religion
in our history. Id. at 674-78. He explained that prior cases had not adopted an absoltitist view of the establishment clause and had upheld government conduct despite the
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clause. The plurality opinion strayed from the record by misconstruing the district court's holding and overlooking its findings of
fact. In addition, the plurality departed significantly from prior
caselaw by ignoring the neutrality principle underlying prior establishment clause cases and by narrowing the scope of the establishment clause.
The plurality held that the city had a secular purpose in displaying the creche, 23 based, in part, on a finding that Christmas is a
national holiday. The plurality did not discuss its reasons for this
finding, nor did it acknowledge the district court's findings to the
contrary. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the plurality, observed
that the creche must be examined in the context of the entire Christmas season and stated that the "creche in the display depicts the
historical origins of this traditional event long recognized as a Na24
tional Holiday." 1
The plurality imputed its finding-that the display depicted the
historical origins of a national holiday-to the city's purpose in displaying the creche. The Chief Justice recognized the religious significance of the creche and explicitly rejected the suggestion that it
was holding that the creche is a secular symbol like Santa Claus or
the talking wishing well.' 25 Instead, the plurality advanced the notion that inclusion of the creche in the larger display simply depicted
the historical origins of Christmas 12 6 and that the creche merely
happened to coincide with the tenets of certain religions. 127
The assertion that the creche simply depicted the historical origins of the holiday is rather remarkable in light of the district court's
finding that the city included the creche not for historical reasons,
but for the purpose of advancing a religious message. 128 Moreover,
the assertion disregards the finding that Christmas has two distinct
benefit of such conduct conferred on religion. Id. at 678. For a discussion of these prior
cases, see supra notes 30-70 and accompanying text.
123. Id. at 680. The Chief Justice stated that the Lemon test, see supra notes 110-19
and accompanying text, which was first articulated in an opinion that he himself authored, is not necessarily dispositive of First Amendment challenges. He stated that the
Court is unwilling "to be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area."
Id. at 679. The plurality's opinion, however, then goes on to analyze the case under two
of the prongs-the purpose of the action and the extent of the entanglement. The
prong not analyzed-the effect of the action-probably would have been the most problematic in upholding the constitutionality of the city's display.
124. Id.
125. 465 U.S. at 685 n.12.
126. Id. at 680.
127. Id. at 682.
128. See Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1173.
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and very different faces-a secular one and a religious one.' 2 9 The
central figure of the religious element is Christ, and the creche is a
depiction of the religious doctrine relating to his birth. As the district court explained:
The creche is more immediately connected to the religious
import of Christmas because it is a direct representation of
the full Biblical account of the birth of Christ. ...

It depicts

the birth of Christ in a way that is not merely historical. It
has not been so altered over the years as to relegate its religious connection to a matter of historical curiosity. It is the
of the Christian view of the birth and nature of
embodiment
30
Christ. t
In addition to ignoring certain findings, the plurality misconstrued the district court's holding. Chief Justice Burger concluded
that the "District Court's inference, drawn from the religious nature
of the creche, that the City has no secular purpose was, on this record, clearly erroneous."' 13 ' The district court did make this inference, stating that the use of a "patently religious symbol raises an
inference that the City approved and intended to promote the theological message that the symbol conveys."' 1 32 The court, however,
had also relied on other evidence in the record to support this inference. For example, the court found that the city never attempted to
disclaim the endorsement of the religious message when it constructed the Christmas display.' 33 The district court also noted that
any neutral purpose was cast in doubt by the fact that the only religious traditions that have been part of Pawtucket's official displays
are those of the Christian majority.' 3 4 Finally, the court believed
that the absence of a secular purpose was confirmed by the city's
own argument that removal of the creche would be hostile to religion. 3 5 As the district court observed, if the city's purpose was the
neutral recognition of a cultural or historical phenomenon, it would
not have considered elimination of the creche a blow to religion. 36
Based on these findings, the city's arguments, statements by the
mayor, and other evidence in the record, the district court found
that the nativity scene was made part of the larger Christmas display
129. Id. at 1163.
130. Id. at 1167 (emphasis added).
131. Id. (footnote omitted).

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 1172.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1172-73.
Id. at 1173.
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precisely in order to keep Christ in Christmas.' 3 7 As a factual
matter, therefore, and not merely as an inference from the religious
nature of the creche, the district court determined that the city's
purpose was the approval and endorsement of a religious
message.' 3 8 Yet the plurality ignored this detailed analysis by the
lower court.
The plurality also refused to acknowledge that the Supreme
Court itself had previously inferred the absence of a secular purpose
solely from the religious nature of challenged conduct. In Stone v.
Graham,t 39 the Court addressed the constitutionality of a statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in public school
classrooms. The statute also required that each display contain the
following notation: "The secular application of the Ten Commandments is clearly seen in its adoption as the fundamental legal code of
Western Civilization and the Common Law of the United States."' 40
The trial court found that the statute served a secular purpose and
upheld the law.' 4 1 Despite the statute's stated legislative purpose
and the findings of the trial court, the Supreme Court reversed without the benefit of briefs or oral argument. Relying solely on the
religious nature of the Ten Commandments, the Court concluded
that the purpose of their posting on schoolroom walls was plainly
religious. 4 ' As the Court stated, "The Ten Commandments are
undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no
legislative recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to
43
that fact."'
Not surprisingly, the district court in Lynch relied on Stone in
finding an impermissible religious purpose behind the display of the
creche.144 The creche-certainly no less so than the Ten Commandments-is a sacred, religious symbol representing a central
tenet of Christianity. 145 Nevertheless, the Lynch plurality attempted
to distinguish Stone on the ground that, in the latter case, the statute
was motivated "wholly by religious considerations. "146 The plurality's attempt to recast the Stone opinion obscured, if not totally
137. Id. at 1173-74.
138. Id. at 1174.
139. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 40 n.I.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 41, 43.
Id. at 41 (footnote omitted).
525 F. Supp. at 1171-72.
See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
465 U.S. at 680 (emphasis added).
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ignored, the fact that, in Stone, the state legislature articulated and
the trial court found a secular purpose for posting the Ten Commandments. The Supreme Court's contrary conclusion in Stone was
derived solely from the religious nature of that symbol.
Lynch presented an even stronger case for finding an impermissible purpose. First, the Court could have inferred, as it did in Stone,
a religious purpose solely from the distinctively religious nature of
the challenged symbol. In addition, the Court could have accepted
the district court's finding, based on testimony and other evidence,
that the city's actual purpose was advancement of the religious
message embodied in the creche.
A more disturbing aspect of the Lynch plurality opinion than
either its casual treatment of the record or its improper characterization of Stone is the plurality's abandonment of the neutrality principle" 4 7 as a calculus for resolving establishment clause cases. The
departure from the neutrality principle fundamentally threatens first
amendment values. The ChiefJustice did not even pay lip service to
the need for governmental neutrality in matters of religion. Equally
startling was the plurality's willingness to depart from its own
scrupulous neutrality and to align itself with the doctrine of a particular religion.
The plurality, despite conceding that the creche has religious
significance, 148 stated that it was "unable to discern a greater aid to
religion deriving from inclusion of the creche than from these benefits and endorsements previously held not violative of the Establishment Clause."' 149 In making this assertion, the plurality simply
disregarded the premise underlying those other cases. In each of
those cases the aid was upheld because it was "so separate and so
undisputably marked off from the religious function"' 50 that it reflected a neutral posture toward religion. In each instance, the aid
took the form of a "secular, neutral, or nonideological"'' 5 service.
Moreover, in upholding such aid the Court itself expressly avoided
conferring its own blessings on any religious practice or theory.
Lynch is plainly distinguishable from these prior cases. Government support for a symbol as deeply involved with religious significance as the creche cannot be characterized as a secular, neutral, or
147. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
148. 468 U.S. at 687.
149. Id. at 682.
150. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).

151. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 687 (1971). See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S.
734 (1973). But see Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
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nonideological service. The plurality made no real attempt to characterize the aid as such, perhaps recognizing the futility of such an
effort. In addition, because the creche is associated only with Christianity, the aid here supports one religion.
The plurality's suggestion that McGowan v. Maryland152 somehow supports the result in Lynch distorts the actual holding in the
former case. In McGowan, the Court upheld the Maryland Sunday
Closing Laws only after finding that their present purpose was to
protect the public health, safety, and welfare, and that they had become disassociated from their religious origins. 5 ' Indeed, the
Court indicated that Sunday Closing Laws may well violate the establishment clause if it were shown that their purpose or effect was
to use the state's coercive power to aid religion.' 5 4 Thus, it was disingenuous for the Lynch plurality to suggest that the creche is no
more identified with religion than the Sunday Closing Laws. The
underlying rationale of McGowan was that the laws in question had
been separated from their religious foundations. By contrast, it cannot seriously be maintained that the creche similarly has been divorced from its religious origins. In short, McGowan provides no
support for the result in Lynch, but instead serves to highlight how
far the Lynch plurality departed from the neutrality principle.
Likewise, contrary to the plurality's suggestion,' 5 5 the nativity
scene in the Christmas display is not analogous to religious paintings in a public gallery. As one commentator stated, "At a museum
....observers expect to be exposed to a variety of works of art and
literature, including those influenced by religion; thus, inclusion of
such works carries no message about the display organizers' view or
endorsement of religion."' 5 6 It would be possible to uphold the
practice of including religious paintings in public galleries without
doing any disservice to the neutrality principle, for by including
religious paintings among the many works of art in public galleries,
the government shows no partiality to religion in general, or to any
specific religious sect. 1 57 In this regard, the public display of religious art work is comparable to the practice of providing bus transportation to all pupils, including those attending religious
152. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
153. Id. at 447-49. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
154. 366 U.S. at 453.
155. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683.
156. Note, Leading Cases of the 1983 Term, 98 HARV. L. REV. 87, 181 (1984); see also
Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1177.
157. Note, supra note 157, at 181.

1986]

RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY

373

schools,' 5 1 or the practice of granting certain tax exemptions to all
charities, including religious ones. 151 Were it to uphold such a practice in the face of a constitutional challenge, the Court would merely
be giving its stamp of approval to public funding of art displays; it
would not be giving its approval to any religious message contained
in the paintings themselves.
The nativity scene challenged in Lynch stands on very different
footing. It is not merely a work of art included among other art
objects in a museum. The creche was placed in the Christmas dis60
play precisely to promote the religious message of Christmas.
When the Court sustained the constitutionality of that practice, it
threw its weight behind the religious message.
The plurality's willingness to endorse a particular religious denomination further underscores the plurality's departure from the
neutrality principle. Lynch did not involve government support for a
broad range of private organizations, among them various religious
groups; 16 ' rather, Pawtucket provided governmental sponsorship
for a single religious message-that of the Christian majority. None
of the cases relied on by the plurality sanctioned such governmental
62
preference for a single denomination. Indeed, in Larson v. Valente 1
the Court held, "[W]hen we are presented with a state law granting
a denominational preference, our precedents demand that we treat
the law as suspect and that we apply strict scrutiny in adjudging its
constitutionality."' 16 1 In a cavalier and unconvincing fashion, the
Lynch plurality dispensed with Larson by stating that it was unable to
see the creche display "as explicitly discriminatory in the sense contemplated in Larson.""
The entire tenor of the ChiefJustice's opinion plainly suggests
that the plurality was unable to perceive any real danger to religious
freedom resulting from public expenditure of small sums on the display of a nativity scene. For the plurality, Christmas-and thus the

158. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
159. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
160. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1161-62.
161. Compare McCreary v. Stone, 575 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd 739 F.2d
716 (2nd Cir. 1984), aff'd by an equally divided court sub non. Board of Trustees of the
Village of Scarsdale v. McCreary, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985).
162. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
163. Id. at 246.
164. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 n.13.
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religious symbolism of the creche-is an acceptable part of our heritage.t 6 5 Yet as Justice Brennan aptly observed, by adopting this position, the plurality took "a long step backwards to the days when
Justice Brewer could arrogantly declare for the Court that 'this is a
Christian nation.' "166
D.

The Scope of the Establishment Clause

The neutrality principle emerged as the vehicle to resolve the
difficulties courts have encountered in determining when laws impermissibly "aided religion."'' 6 7 It may not have served as a perfect
litmus, but through its use, the Court had been able to maintain the
delicate balance between the objective of preventing state intrusion
into religious matters and the reality that total separation of religion
and state is impossible.
The momentum that began with Mueller, increased with Marsh,
and received a decided thrust with Lynch was more than a shift away
from the neutrality principle. The proposition that governmentincluding the Supreme Court-should remain neutral in religious
matters is not an end in itself, but rather a means to safeguard the
principle of religious liberty that lies at the core of the first amendment.' 68 In abandoning the neutrality principle, the plurality departed from the very purposes of the establishment clause as
described in Everson. In short, the step taken by Lynch was towards a
redefinition-and narrowing-of the establishment clause.
The precise conduct proscribed by the establishment clause is
not easily determined by reference to the language or even the history of the first amendment.' 69 Much is known about the Framers'
165. Id. at 674-78, 685-86.
166. Id. at 717-18 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (quoting Church of Holy Trinity v. United
States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892).
167. Even before Everson v. Board of Educ., the Court used the neutrality principle to
resolve some of its first amendment cases. See generally R. MORGAN, supra note 19, at 3236.
168. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940):
The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent
as Congress to enact such laws. The constitutional inhibition of legislation on
the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of
worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other
hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion.
169. See generally Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to ParochialSchools, 56 CALIF.
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views on religious freedom, particularly those of Madison andJefferson.' 7 ° The historical evidence, however, does not provide many
specific answers, and in these cases a literal quest for the Framers'
intent may be both futile and misdirected.' 7 ' As the Court stated in
its first full examination of the establishment clause:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a
person to go to or to remain away from church against his
will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance
or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small,
can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they
may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor
the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups
and vice versa. In the words ofJefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended17to
erect "a
2
wall of separation between church and state."'
The Lynch plurality clearly indicated its direction when it stated
that the purpose of the establishment clause is the very limited one
of preventing the actual establishment of a state church or religion.1 73 At one point, the plurality observed that the Court's role in
establishment clause cases is "to determine whether, in reality, [the
challenged conduct] establishes a religion or religious faith, or
tends to do so."' 7 4 In keeping with this theme, the plurality later
L. REV. 260, 264 (1968); Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr.Jefferson's Crumbling
Wall - A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770 (1984).
170. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 33-41 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
171. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan wrote:
While it is clear to me that the Framers meant the Establishment Clause to
prohibit more than the creation of an established federal church such as existed
in England, I have no doubt that, in their preoccupation with the imminent
question of established churches, they gave no distinct consideration to the
particular question whether the clause also forbade devotional exercises in
public institutions.
Id. at 237-38.
172. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (citation omitted).
173. 465 U.S. at 678.
174. Id.
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observed that any notion that the creche poses "a real5 danger of
17
establishment of a state church is far-fetched indeed."'
The plurality's reliance on the views of Justice Story is especially revealing.' 76 Although it quoted from one part of Story's Commentanes on the Constitution, the plurality failed to mention that Story
firmly believed that we are not simply a religious people, but a Christian people. Story wrote that it is "the especial duty of government
to foster and encourage [the truth of Christianity] among all the citizens and subjects. "177 Richard Morgan has carefully examined
Story's views on the first amendment and concluded that Story had a
"truncated notion of the separation of church and state"' 7 ' and believed in full accommodation between government and the Christian churches.'17 What is interesting about Story's position, Morgan
wrote, is its "aberrational quality" in the sense that Story's approach
is "high and dry, out of the mainstream of American constitutional
law."' 0 Morgan's conclusion must now be qualified: "at least until
Lynch v. Donnelly."
Notwithstanding the Lynch plurality's reconstructionist efforts,
the well settled interpretation of the establishment clause had been
that it forbids more than the establishment of a state church or religion. The Court had previously found that the establishment clause
prohibited a state 8 " from engaging in a much wider range of activity, including allowing religious groups to enter public schools during regular hours for religious instruction; 182 composing a
nondenominational, voluntary prayer for students;18 3 requiring Bible readings at the start of the school day;' 8 4 prohibiting the teaching of evolution; 1 85 paying a salary supplement to teachers teaching
nonreligious courses in sectarian schools; 1 86 providing money7
18
grants for maintenance of facilities operated by sectarian schools;
175. Id. at 686.
176. See id. at 678.
177. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES

ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,

§ 1865

at

723 (1833).
178. R. MORGAN, supra note 19, at 38-39.
179. Id. at 39.
180. Id. at 40.

181. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (holding that "[t]he fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth Amendment] embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment").
182. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
183. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
184. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
185. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
186. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
187. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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providing tuition reimbursements to parents of children attending
reimbursing religious schools for the cost of
religious schools;'
testing and record-keeping mandated by state;' 8 9 loaning instructional material and equipment to religious schools. 9 ° or directly to
students attending such schools;' 9 ' funding field trips by students in
religious schools;' 9 2 requiring posting of the Ten Commandments
on walls of public classrooms; 9 3 and imposing registration and reporting requirements on religious organizations that solicit more
than fifty percent of their funds from nonmembers.' 9 4
On prior occasions the Court had expressly rejected the suggestion that the establishment clause had the narrow purpose of
prohibiting only conduct that actually establishes, or tends to establish, a state religion or church. In Everson,' 9 5 for example, the Court
adopted a much broader interpretation of the first amendment provision.1 9 6 The establishment of a state church and the compulsion
of particular religious beliefs are only two of the prohibited activities
described by the Court in that case.1 97
This broad interpretation of the first amendment withstood a
direct challenge in Illinois ex rel McCollum v. Board of Education.19 8
The defendants argued that the Court should renounce the expansive view of the establishment clause expressed in Everson and hold
that the first amendment was intended only to forbid governmental
preference of one religion to the exclusion of others.' 99 The Court
gave "full consideration" 2 0 0 to the argument and then explicitly rejected the invitation to repudiate Everson in favor of a narrower view
of the establishment clause.
In Engel v. Vitale,2 ° 1 the Court once again refused to endorse the
notion that the establishment clause has the limited purpose of
prohibiting establishment of one particular religion. Justice Black
stated for the Court:
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id.; see also Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
Id.
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Id. at 15.
Id. at 15-16.
333 U.S. 203 (1948).
Id. at 211.
Id.
370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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It is true that New York's establishment of its Regents'
prayer as an officially approved religious doctrine of that
State does not amount to a total establishment of one particular religious sect to the exclusion of all others-that, indeed, the governmental endorsement of that prayer seems
relatively insignificant when compared to the governmental
encroachments upon religion which were commonplace
200 years ago. To those who may subscribe to the view
that because the Regents' official prayer is so brief and general there can be no danger to religious freedom in its governmental establishment, however, it may be appropriate
to say in the words of James Madison, the author of the
First Amendment: "[I]t is proper to take alarm at the first
experiment on our liberties ....

Who does not see that the

same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the same
ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all
other Sects? That the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the
support of any one establishment, may force him to
conform to any other establishment in all cases
whatsoever?" 2 " 2
In Abington School District v. Schempp, 20 3 the Court "rejected unequivocally the contention that the Establishment Clause forbids
only governmental preference of one religion over another.

' 20 4

In

so doing, the Court reaffirmed its conclusion that the purpose of the
first amendment was not merely to forbid the establishment of a single sect, creed or religion. 20 5 " '[T]he object was broader than separating church and state in this narrow sense. It was to create a
complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form
of public aid or support for religion.' "206
IV.

A

REAFFIRMATION OF RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY

Both the abandonment of the neutrality principle and the suggestion that the establishment clause has the limited purpose of
prohibiting the establishment of a state church or religion represented substantial departures from well-settled first amendment
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 436 (footnote omitted).
374 U.S. 203 (1963).
Id. at 216.
Id. at 217.

206. Id. (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 31-32 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)).
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principles. Not surprisingly, commentators forecasted significant
changes in establishment clause jurisprudence. 21 7 In view of the approach taken by the Lynch plurality, such predictions were well
founded. As the Court itself had previously noted, "[I]n constitutional adjudication some steps, which when taken were thought to
approach 'the verge,' have become the platform for yet further
steps. A certain momentum develops in constitutional theory and it
can be a 'downhill thrust' easily set in motion but difficult to retard
or stop." 2 °8 Lynch certainly appeared to provide the platform for
further inroads on the scope of the establishment clause and on the
neutrality principle.
Predictions of a "downhill thrust," however, may have been
premature. While the Lynch decision approached the "verge" of establishment clause jurisprudence, the Court more recently has declined to take further steps down that slope. During the last Term,
the Supreme Court decided four cases in which it did not follow the
direction taken by Lynch and, in three of the cases, reaffirmed the
need for scrupulous neutrality by government in religious
matters.209

In Estate of Thorton v. Caldor, Inc. ,211 the Court invalidated a Connecticut statute that gave employees the right not to work on their
chosen sabbath. The Court held that the statute violated the establishment clause, but its decision did not rest squarely on the neutrality principle. The Chief Justice, who authored the brief opinion,
stated that the law contravened a "fundamental principle of the
Religion Clauses. "21' He then quoted, not from one of the Court's
own discussions of religious neutrality, but instead from the Second
Circuit's decision in Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad,2 12 in which
Judge Learned Hand stated that "[t]he First Amendment .. .gives
no one the right to insist that in the pursuit of [his] own interests
others must conform their conduct to his own religious necessities." 21 3 Thus, although not re-establishing the neutrality principle,
the Court in Thorton resisted an opportunity to continue the trend
of the Lynch cases.
207. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, supra note 170.
208. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 624 (1971).
209. Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985); Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 105
S. Ct. 3216 (1985); Estate ofThorton v.Caldor, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985); Wallacev.
Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985).
210. 105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985).
211. Id. at 2918.
212. 205 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1953).

213. Id.at 61.
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Unlike Estate of Thorton, the three other decisions clearly endorsed the principle that government officials must pursue a neutral
2 14
course in religious matters. In Grand Rapids School District v. Ball,
the Court concluded that the school district violated the establishment clause by operating its Community Education and Shared
Time Programs in sectarian schools. Both programs involved
classes for nonpublic school students, including those attending
religious schools, that were taught by teachers hired by the public
school system and conducted in nonpublic school classrooms. The
Court held that the programs impermissibly advanced religion in
three respects: First, they entailed the risk that the participating
teachers may become involved in intentionally or inadvertently inculcating a religious message.21 5 Second, the programs provided a
symbolic union of church and state that was likely to influence
young children.21 6 Finally, the two programs directly promoted
religion by providing a direct subsidy to religious schools for instructional services and materials in parochial school buildings.21 7
In Aguilar v. Felton,2 18 the companion case to Ball, the Court invalidated New York City's Title I program. 21 9 Through this program, the city used federal funds to pay the salaries of teachers who
provided remedial instructional services to parochial students in parochial school buildings. The defendants in Aguilar attempted to
distinguish their program from those challenged in Ball on the
ground that New York City had adopted a system for monitoring the
religious content of the Title I classes. The Court ruled that New
York's program violated the establishment clause precisely because of
this monitoring system. It held that the system resulted in excessive-and constitutionally impermissible-entanglement between
church and state. Under the pervasive monitoring system, agents of
the State of New York inspected the religious schools regularly for
the presence of religious matter in Title I classes. Church and state
thus became entangled in two ways: First, religious institutions
were forced to endure the presence of state personnel and to submit
to the state's determination of what is a religious symbol..22 0 Second, administrative personnel of public and parochial schools
214. 105 S. Ct. 3216, 3230-31 (1985).

215. Id. at 3223.
216. Id. at 3223-24.
217. Id. at 3224.
218. 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985).
219. 105 S. Ct. at 3237, 3239. Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2854 (1982).
220. 105 S. Ct. at 3238-39.
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worked closely together in resolving problems related to scheduling
the program.2 2 ' Accordingly, the Court concluded:
Despite the well-intentioned efforts taken by the City
of New York, the program remains constitutionally flawed
owing to the nature of the aid, to the institution receiving
the aid, and to the constitutional principles that they implicate-that neither the State nor Federal Government shall
promote or hinder a particular faith or faith generally
through the advancement of benefits or through the excessive entanglement of church and state in the administration
of those benefits.2 2 2
Perhaps the strongest reaffirmation of the neutrality principle
occurred in Wallace v. Jaffree,2 2 s in which the Court struck down an
Alabama statute authorizing a period of silence in public schools for
meditation or silent prayer. 224 The Court reaffirmed the principle
that government must remain neutral in matters of religious theory,
doctrine, and practice. It observed that by amending the statute to
allow a moment of silence for "voluntary prayer," the Alabama legislature "intended to characterize prayer as a favored practice. Such
an endorsement is not consistent with the established principle that
the Government must pursue a course of complete neutrality toward
religion."225

All four cases are also significant because they repudiate the
Lynch plurality's notion that the establishment clause forbids only
the creation of a state church or religion. The programs and laws
challenged in these cases created little, if any, danger of the estab221
Yet, as the Court expressly stated:
lishment of a state religion.
"The First Amendment's guarantee that 'Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion'

. . .

is more than a

221. Id. at 3239.
222. Id. (emphasis added).
223. 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985).
224. The Court also rejected the remarkable suggestion that it should overrule
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), which held that the first amendment religion clauses were incorporated through the fourteenth amendment as limitations on the
states. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens stated in unequivocal terms: "[W]hen the
Constitution was amended to prohibit any State from depriving any person of liberty
without due process of law, that [Fourteenth] Amendment imposed the same substantive limitations on the States' power to legislate that the First Amendment had always
imposed on the Congress' power." ll'dlace, 105 S. Ct. at 2486. The Court's refusal to
retreat from Cantwell may have broader implications and signal a willingness to rebuff
any attempts to make inroads on the incorporation doctrine generally.
225. 105 S. Ct. at 2492 (emphasis added).
226. Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. 3240 (Powell, J., concurring).
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pledge that no single religion will be designated as a state religion. . . . The Establishment Clause instead primarily proscribes
'sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.' "227
From among the speculation on the reasons for the Court's abrupt turnabout from Lynch, one point clearly emerges: The change
in direction coincided with a switch in vote by Justice Powell.
Although he joined the plurality's more restrictive view of the establishment clause in Lynch, in the more recent cases he aligned himself
with the expansive view of the majorities. Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Aguilar suggests that his change in vote might have
been due to his concern that public aid to religion would produce a
serious risk of ongoing political divisiveness:
[T]here remains a considerable risk of continuing political
strife over the propriety of direct aid to religious schools
and the proper allocation of limited governmental resources. As this Court has repeatedly recognized, therie is a
likelihood whenever direct governmental aid is extended to
some groups that there will be competition and strife
among them and others to gain, maintain, or increase the
financial support of government. In states such as New
York that have large and varied sectarian populations, one
can be assured that politics will enter into any state decision to aid parochial schools. Public schools, as well as private schools, are under increasing financial pressure to
meet real and perceived needs. Thus, any proposal to extend direct governmental aid to parochial schools alone is
likely to spark political disagreement from taxpayers who
support the public schools, as well as from non-recipient
sectarian groups, who may fear that needed funds are being diverted from them. In short, aid to parochial schools
of the sort at issue here potentially leads to "that kind and
degree of government involvement in religious life that, as
history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and frequently
strain a political system to the breaking point." Although
the Court's opinion does not discuss it at length, the potential for such divisiveness is a strong additional reason for
holding that the Title I and Grand Rapids programs are
invalid on entanglement grounds. -' -

227. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3221-22 (quoting Committee for Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 772 (1973)).
228. Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3240 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Walz v. Tax Conimission, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (opinion of HarlanJ.)) (citations omitted).
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Justice Powell's emphasis on the potential for political strife is
particularly significant in light of the discussion of that issue in
Lynch. The Lynch plurality noted that political divisiveness alone
cannot serve to invalidate otherwise permissible conduct and found
that any political strife was caused, not by the creche, but by the
lawsuit.

229

Regardless of the reasons, the recent decisions do represent a
change in direction from Lynch. The "downhill thrust" provided by
that case has been retarded, at least for now. The recent cases
seem to expose Lynch for what it is-an aberration that will be limited to its facts and then perhaps fade away. The question remains,
however, whether the repudiation of the Lynch approach is complete. Lower courts have adopted a more expansive view of Lynch.2 °
In addition, as suggested above, the change from Lynch may reflect
nothing more than the switch in vote by Justice Powell. 23 ' Furthermore, there are sound bases for caution in predicting the complete
demise of Lynch and that the wall between state and church is as
strong as ever.
The first reason that the complete repudiation of Lynch should
not be freely predicted is that the three cases which most clearly
pronounced the reaffirmation of the neutrality principle involved
schoolchildren. The desire to maintain a course of neutrality toward religion is arguably strongest when impressionable children
are affected. As the Court observed in Ball, particular care must be
taken when the recipients of a governmental message are children in
their formative years: "The symbolism of a union between church
and state is most likely to influence children of tender years, whose
experience is limited and whose beliefs consequently are the func' 23 2
tion of environment as much as of free and voluntary choice.
Thus, efforts might be made to limit the reach of the recent cases to
school-aid challenges involving young children.

229. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684-85.
230. See, e.g., Friedman v. Board of County Comm'rs, 781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1985).
(Although the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals eventually reversed on rehearing en banc,
a panel of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals originally relied on Ly nch in holding that
Bernalillo County, New Mexico, did not violate the establishment clause by including
another Christian symbol-the cross--on its county seal.)
231. See supra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
232. Ball, 105 S. Ct. at 3225; see generally, Giannella, Religious Liberty, .onestablishennt
and DoctrinalDevelopment: Part H, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 561-90 (1968) (permissable degree of state involvement with religion in the schools differs with the various levels of
education).

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 46:352

A second reason for caution is that the narrow view of the establishment clause has stronger support on the present Court than
at any previous time. Initially, Justice Reed was the lone subscriber
to the view that the establishment clause forbids only a state church
or religion. 2 33 Later, Justice Stewart appeared to adopt this position.2 34 Now, the ChiefJustice 23 5 and Justice Rehnquist 23 6 embrace
that reading of the establishment clause. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist
offered a lengthy review of the historical evidence in support of the
conclusion that the establishment clause forbade only establishment
of a national religion and preference among religious sects.2 3 7
Although Justice White had never endorsed the notion that the first
amendment prohibits only a state church or religion, 3 8 in Wallace v.
Jaffree, he revealed his support for a basic reconsideration of the
Court's establishment clause precedents, citing Justice Rehnquist's
historical explication as grounds for that reassessment.2 3 9 Justice
O'Connor's views on the establishment clause are still evolving and
it is difficult to predict how she might vote in the future. She has
stated that the relevant issue in establishment clause cases is
whether an "objective observer" would perceive the challenged

233. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 238-56 (Reed, J., dissenting).
234. Engel, 370 U.S. at 444-50 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
235. See, e.g., Wallace, 105 S. Ct. at 2507 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). The ChiefJustice
stated: "The notion that the Alabama statute is a step toward creating an established
church borders on, if it does not trespass into, the ridiculous."
236. See id. at 2509 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 2509-19. The historical evidence, of course, is not as conclusive as suggested by Justice Rehnquist nor is it dispositive in deciding specific cases. See supra notes
171-173 and accompanying text. Indeed, in Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist he
joined Justice White's dissenting opinion that conceded the futility of relying too heavily
on the history of the first amendment: "[O]ne cannot seriously believe that the history
of the First Amendment furnishes unequivocal answers to many of the fundamental issues of church-state relations." 413 U.S. 756, 820 (1973) (WhiteJ, dissenting). On the
use of history in constitutional interpretation Professor Alexander Bickel has written:
Like the text, we may thus conclude, history cannot displace judgment. And
like the text, it should not, if it could. For, as Brandeis said on more than one
occasion, and as the Framers themselves well knew, 'the only abiding thing is
change'.... We require to know, as accurately as may be, whence we come, in
order to be aware that it is our own reasoned and revocable will, not some
idealized ancestral compulsion, that moves us forward.
A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, 108, 110 (1962).
238. Justice White has been out of step with many of the Court's establishment clause
cases. See, e.g., Nquist, 413 U.S. at 813; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 661 (White, J., dissenting).
239. W1allace, 105 S. Ct. at 2508 (White, J., dissenting).
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conduct as an endorsement of religion.2 4 ° Although the endorsement test looks very similar to the neutrality principle, 2 4 , Justice

O'Connor opposed the proposition that the first amendment requires complete neutrality. 24 2 Moreover, her views emerge more
clearly from the application than the enunciation of her test. On the
basis of the record in Lynch, 2 4 3 an objective observer might easily
have perceived-indeed, the district court found-that the city of
Pawtucket was endorsing a religious message by including the
creche. Yet, Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment upholding the city's conduct.2 4 4 Thus, in the present Court, four Justices
arguably support a narrow construction of the establishment clause.
The Justice Department's position suggests a final reason to
doubt that the neutrality principle is again firmly embedded in first
amendment jurisprudence. In three of the recent cases,2" 5 the Department appeared either on behalf of a party or as an amicus curiae
and argued in support of the constitutionality of the challenged conduct. 246 Additionally, at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar
Association, Attorney General Meese harshly criticized the recent
religion decisions and continued to assert that the establisment
clause does not require neutrality, but only prohibits establishment
of a national church.2 4 7 Apparently, the present administration is
not yet ready to concede defeat on this issue.
Although these arguments caution against predicting the complete demise of Lynch, the recent cases do demonstrate that Lynch
will not be readily extended. While Lynch weakened the foundation,
the wall continues to stand. For now, the downhill momentum of
Lynch has been retarded. During the last Term, the Court reaffirmed the fundamental proposition that government must remain
neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice in order for religious liberty to flourish. Equally important, the Court
reasserted its own neutrality on religious matters. In Lynch a plurality of the Court willingly embraced a sacred religious symbol of a
240. Id. at 2501 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
241. Indeed, in the Ball case, the majority cited the endorsement test with approval.
105 S. Ct. at 3226.
242. Hallace, 105 S. Ct. at 2504 (O'Connor, Jr., dissenting).
243. See supra notes 113-117 and accompanying text.
244. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
245. Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. 3232; Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216; Wallace, 105 S. Ct. 2479.
246. See Brief for the Secretary of Education, Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232; Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Grand Rapids School
District v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Wallace v.
Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479.
247. 54 U.S.L.W. 2037-38 (July 16, 1985).
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specific denomination. In its more recent decisions, however, the
Court carefully avoided even a symbolic link between itself and religion or religious practices. It should be stressed that such scrupulous avoidance of a union between the Court and religion does not
represent any hostility toward religion or a lack of appreciation for
the central role that religion has played in our culture. Quite to the
contrary, it is a recognition that such a link would both degrade religion and threaten the very legitimacy of the Court. 248 Lynch plainly
illustrates these dangers. Norman Redlich, Dean of the New York
University School of Law, has pointed out that the Court, by embracing a Christian symbol, does "exactly what the Constitution was
designed to prevent: It denigrates religion by trying to convert a
religious symbol into a secular observance, and it shuts the door on
symbol because it conflicts
those of us who cannot accept a religious
249
beliefs."
religious
deepest
our
with
For the time being, the Court has returned to a course of religious neutrality.2 5 ° Such a course may well require the Court to engage in "interpretation of a delicate sort." 2 5 ' Nevertheless, in order
to maintain the exalted place of religion and the prominent position
of the Court, it is a course that should-indeed, must-be pursued.

248. 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) (The "first and most immediate purpose [of the establishment clause] rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to
destroy government and to degrade religion.")
249. Redlich, Nativity Ruling InsultsJews, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1984, at A19, col.2.
250. For the most recent application of the neutrality principle, see Witters v. Washington Dept. of Serv. for the Blind, 54 U.S.L.W. 4135 (1986).
251. Abington, 374 U.S. at 226. The religious neutrality principle does not require the
Court to adopt an absolutist position on separation of church and state. On various
occasions, application of the principle has allowed the Court to uphold neutral, nonideological practices that nevertheless benefit religion. See supra notes 30-70 and accompanying text.
While this Article has focused on the role of the neutrality principle in establishment clause cases, it should be mentioned that the principle also plays a role in free
exercise cases. At times, there may be a tension between the two religion clauses. See
Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PlTr. L.
REV. 673 (1980). The neutrality principle aids in reducing the tension. For example, a
state violates the free exercise clause by denying unemployment benefits to a Jehovah's
Witness who terminated his job because his religious beliefs forbade participation in the
production of armaments. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981). On the other
hand, it might be argued that the state aids in the establishment of a religion by providing such benefits. Such an argument might be persuasive if the establishment clause
mandated absolute separation. However, as this Article has argued, that clause does not
mandate the extreme position but instead requires a course of neutrality. Such a course
would be followed if the state provided benefits for all employees who terminated their
work for good cause, including good cause related to religious beliefs. Id. at 719-20.

